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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes the effects of the “War on Drugs” on crime rates.  Many in the field of law 
enforcement believe that incarcerating drug offenders reduces crime.  However, time-series 
analysis of four types of crime rates in the United States does not support this view.  Using seven 
explanatory variables, including federal spending on the Drug Enforcement Agency, incarceration 
rates for drug offenders, and abortion rates, the results suggest the incarceration of drug 
offenders causes a crowding-out effect in prisons, releasing non-drug offenders and thereby 
potentially increasing, rather than reducing crime.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
his paper studies the effects of the “War on Drugs” as measured by mandatory sentencing laws, 
federal spending on the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and drug related incarcerations on 
crime rates. For many years, politicians have been enamored with the idea that increasing 
incarceration rates for drug offenders will decrease the crime rate. “You don’t have to do a scientific study to 
determine what every law enforcement officer in America knows: drugs breed crime.”1  This notion has led to a rise 
in prison construction, the imposition of mandatory sentencing, and the passage of “three-strikes” laws to name a 
few.  
 
In contrast, many economists have supported the decriminalization of drugs, in particular marijuana, and 
enumerated various social and economic costs associated with their prohibition.  In fact, some argue that the 
prohibition of drugs will create more crime than it will prevent. Mandatory minimum sentencing laws, for instance, 
create a crowding-out effect in prisons, where non-drug offenders will be released early from prisons. There is a rich 
literature analyzing the causes and repercussions of drug criminalization and the criminal justice system’s response 
to the drug trade. 
 
This paper will analyze the effects of the war on drugs on crime rates, quantifying the war on drugs with 
variables characterizing the Anti-Drug Act and the density of drug-related convicts in the prison system.  The paper 
is divided into five parts: a brief background on the “War on Drugs,” literature review, model and explanation of 
variables, estimation and results, and conclusion. 
 
THE WAR ON DRUGS 
 
Although the U.S. government has battled drug abuse for decades, it was President Eisenhower’s 
administration that took the first aggressive stance against drugs. In 1954, President Eisenhower coined the term 
“War on Drugs” when he established the Interdepartmental Committee on Narcotics. However, the term "War on 
Drugs" was not widely used until President Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1973 to 
announce "an all-out global war on the drug menace.”2 In the 1980s, President Reagan continued with anti-drug 
policies, possibly stronger than any of his predecessors. During his presidency, numerous anti-drug policies and 
campaigns were enacted to help prevent drug abuse. In 1986, the Anti-Drug Act attempted to control the crack 
                                                 
1 Governor Frank Keating of Oklahoma, http://www.ok.gov/osfdocs/nr10296.html 
2 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887488,00.html 
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cocaine epidemic, which was a relatively inexpensive drug to produce and marketed to low income black 
communities. This act established mandatory minimum sentencing laws for the trafficking and possession of illegal 
drugs. In 2002, the Bush administration's goal of reducing all illegal drug use by 25% led to unprecedented numbers 
of marijuana-related arrests.
3
 
 
In 2009, after almost four decades of the US government’s declaration of a “War on Drugs,” the Obama 
administration's drug czar declared his intention of banishing the concept that the U.S. is fighting "a war on drugs." 
Rather than focusing on the criminalization of drug, the administration’s new perspective is to treat the issue as a 
matter of public health, placing greater emphasis on treatment instead of incarceration. This new direction might be 
an initial step on the path that would bring the war on drugs to an end.
4
 
 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
Becker (1968) argued that criminals are rational and self-interested agents whose behavior must be 
understood within the framework of any decisions made under uncertainty and constraints set forth by the 
government.  Akerlof and Yellen (1994) further refined this approach, suggesting that criminals know the 
probability of being caught, which is a function of law enforcement and the behavior of the community. Lochner 
(2004) introduced education and training in an opportunity cost model of human capital and argued that education 
increased earnings and consequently raised the costs of planning and engaging in crime. 
 
The direct relationship between incarceration and crime rates has attracted interest in the literature. For 
some, including Becker (1968), imprisonment can serve as a deterrent as the individuals consider the expected costs 
and benefits associated with criminal activities. The unsurprising conclusion is that the “more severe punishment 
raises the costs of illegal behavior, thereby convincing at least some individuals to refrain from crime” (DeFina, et 
al.,2002, p.636). On the other hand, others suggest that incarceration in fact may increase crime rates by “weakening 
the controls on crime imposed by individuals, families, and communities” (DeFina, et al.,2002, p.636).  It is argued 
that the effects of the imprisonment on families are devastating which in itself may lead to increases in crime (Rose 
and Clear, 1998, p. 441.) Also, greater imprisonment decreases community cohesiveness by “reducing the likelihood 
that ex-convicts obtain steady, decent jobs” (DeFina, et al., 2002, p.636). Other research focuses on the relationship 
between the war on drugs and criminal activities. Friedman (1991), for instance, attributed the rise in homicide rates 
in the United States to the “War on Drugs.” He also argued that such a war has led to the destruction of many 
communities in the United States. Friedman favored the decriminalization of drugs.  
 
You are not mistaken in believing that drugs are a scourge that is devastating our society. You are not mistaken in 
believing that drugs are tearing asunder our social fabric, ruining the lives of many young people, and imposing 
heavy costs on some of the most disadvantaged among us…. Your mistake is failing to recognize that the very 
measures you favor are a major source of the evils you deplore. Of course the problem is demand, but it is not only 
demand, it is demand that must operate through repressed and illegal channels. Illegality creates obscene profits 
that finance the murderous tactics of the drug lords; illegality leads to the corruption of law enforcement officials; 
illegality monopolizes the efforts of honest law forces so that they are starved for resources to fight the simpler 
crimes of robbery, theft and assault. (Friedman 1990, P.1) 
 
Similarly, Chambliss (1995) asserted that the “War on Drugs” produced many negative consequences. 
Among them is the increasing number of people in prison; with over fifty percent of offenders being those that 
should not be considered in the category of committing “very serious crimes.” According to him, the “War on 
Drugs” has also produced another war: the war on the minority youth of the underclass. Kuziemko and Levitt (2004) 
also maintained that while the number of people incarcerated on drug-related offenses increased 15 times from1980 
to 2000, the overall impact on the reduction in violent and property crime has been very small, suggesting that the 
dramatic increase in drug imprisonment was not cost effective. There are those who stress that the “War on Drugs” 
contributed to a rise in violent crime because the war substantially increased the prices of drugs and created a highly 
profitable and violent black market (Cundiff, 2000). Benson and Rasmussen (1996) argued that crime leads to drug 
                                                 
3 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887488,00.html 
4 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124225891527617397.html 
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use and not the reverse. Not only has the drug war failed to reduce violent and property crime, but it has also shifted 
criminal justice resources (the police, courts, prisons, probation officers, etc.) away from directly fighting violent 
and property crime. The drug war has put citizens’ lives and property at greater risk. 
 
Recently, a group of economists has introduced the idea that the legalization of abortion is a significant 
explanatory factor in the changes in crime rates. Donohue and Levitt (2001) for instance, in studying the decline in 
crime rates in the 1990s, offer evidence that legalized abortion has contributed significantly to crime reduction. They 
argue that crime began to fall roughly eighteen years after the legalization of abortion, and the states that allowed 
abortion earlier than the rest of the country witnessed a reduction earlier than other states. Levitt (2004) provides 
four factors that explain the decline of crime in the 1990s. These factors include increases in the number of police, 
the rising prison population, the receding crack cocaine epidemic, and the legalization of abortion. 
 
MODEL AND VARIABLES 
 
The focus of this paper is the impact of the “War on Drugs” on crime rates. The period of study covers 
1970 to 2009 in the United States. Four categories of crime rates (CRIME INDICATOR) are considered: total crime, 
violent crime, property crime and burglaries. These variables are measured as a rate per 100,000 inhabitants. The 
data for these four variables were compiled from the United States Bureau of Justice Statistics.  
 
The percentage of inmates convicted on drug related offenses (PRIS) and federal spending on the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) are used as rough proxy variables to characterize the intensity of the “War on 
Drugs.” Also included are five other explanatory variables: GDP per capita (GDP), unemployment rate (UE), 
abortion rate (ABRT), the 1986 Anti-Drug Act (1986DRG) and the price of cocaine (COKE). The general form of 
the equation is:  
 
CRIME INDICATOR = β0 + β1PRIS + β2ABRT+ β3COKE + β4GDP + β5UE + β6DEA + β71986DRG  
 
PRIS is the percentage of the federal prison population that has been incarcerated for drug-related offenses.  
If the war on drugs reduced crime rates, the expected coefficient of this variable is negative. DEA is the percentage 
of the annual Federal Justice budget that has been granted to the Drug Enforcement Agency. The source of this 
variable is the DEA webpage. Again, if the “War on Drugs” has been effective, the expected sign on the coefficient 
is negative. 
 
GDP is real per capita GDP (constant 2005 dollars), and is expected to be negatively related to crime rates. 
This variable enters the model in its first difference, focusing attention on the notion that a positive change in the 
source of legitimate income could reduce the incentive to engage in criminal enterprises. The source of the data is 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 
UE is the unemployment rate. This variable displays a periodic trend, so the sine of this variable was 
computed and used in the regression model. As labor market opportunities for lawful sources of income decrease, 
individuals are more likely to turn to non-lawful sources of income. The expected sign of this variable’s coefficient 
is positive.
5
 
 
ABRT is measured as the abortion rate per one thousand live births. This was obtained from the Centers for 
Disease Control and United Nations. Based on Levitt (2004), the expected sign of this variable’s coefficient is 
negative. This variable is lagged twenty years and thus ranges from 1950 to 1989.  
 
1986DRG is a binomial regressor used to account for the years that the 1986 Anti-Drug Act was in place. 
The bill became law in 1986, and aggressively targeted the possession and trafficking of crack cocaine. If the bill 
was effective in decreasing crime, this variable should enter the model with a negative sign. Alternatively, if critics 
of the “War on Drugs” are correct, this law will increase out-of-prison crime rates.  
 
                                                 
5Following Johnson (2012) and Chu (1998), the sine of a variable displaying a periodic trend can be included in the linear 
regression model. 
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COKE is the average reported price (in dollars) of less than two grams of cocaine. This data was taken 
from the National Criminal Justice Reporting Services. Being relatively more expensive than most other drugs, 
cocaine is the drug of choice for relatively high income individuals. Therefore, higher prices potentially imply 
higher profit margins and may consequently cause increased crime. 
 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 TOTAL BRGLY VLNT PROP COKE UE PRIS ABRT DEA GDP 1986DRG 
Mean 4914 1135.6 555.7 4358 521.5 -0.23 43.14 175.31 907.2 529.1 0.57 
Median 5114 1195.2 538.4 4596 293.2 -0.49 51.05 29.25 713.5 633.8 1 
Max 5950 1684 758.1 5353 2494 0.98 61.3 434.6 2494 1448 1 
Min 3669 722 396 3211 105.5 -0.99 16.9 0.07 197.9 -668.7 0 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The results of the time series analysis are presented in Table 2.
6
 PRIS, the percentage of the federal prison 
population incarcerated for drug related offenses, is significant and positive for total crime, property crime and 
burglary.  The positive coefficients are consistent with Benson’s, et al (1996) argument that as a result of mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws, the sentencing discretion of judges is removed and it forces the drug offender into 
incarceration. When prisons become crowded with drug offenders, jailers must make room for them by releasing 
non-drug offenders. The DEA budget had a negative and significant effect on all categories of crime rates, and may 
indicate that expenditures on the DEA decrease out-of-prison crime. The binary variable for the Anti-Drug Act of 
1986 is positive and significant at conventional levels in 3 of the 4 models, the exception being in the model for 
burglary rates. The positive coefficient suggests the effects of the Act are statistically associated with increased 
crimes, the opposite of what lawmakers had intended.  
 
Abortion rates, as expected, have a negative effect on crime rates; it was significant when regressed against 
all crime rates with the exception of violent crime. This is consistent with Levitt’s research that abortion decreases 
crime. Real per-capita GDP, as expected, has a negative and significant effect on all crime rates, indicating that with 
an increase in the number of legitimate avenues for income, the incentive to commit crime falls. The price of 
cocaine has a negative and significant effect on total crime, property crime, and burglary rates.  However, it has a 
significant and positive effect on violent crime rates, suggesting the possibility that an increase in the price of 
cocaine can lead to the commission of more violent crimes, perhaps as a result of disputes over the drug. 
 
One implication of these results is that the Anti-Drug Act and increasing density of drug-related convicts in 
the nation’s prisons may be contributing to increased crime rates. However, the DEA budget, calculated as the 
proportion of the annual Federal Justice budget granted to the DEA, has a negative and significant effect on all 
crime rates. 
 
With respect to policy implications, these results indicate that laws enacted as a result of the “War on 
Drugs” have been detrimental to society, increasing crime in the four categories considered. The mechanism through 
which this appears to happen is that the increasing density of drug-related convicts in the prison system crowds out 
other criminals who may be more likely to commit a victimized crime. This research suggests that incarceration of 
drug offenders may increase other types of crime. Incarceration of drug-offenders, then, is ineffective as a sole 
means by which to reduce the use of illicit drugs and their potential adverse effects on society. 
 
                                                 
6The variables were tested using the Augmented Dickey Fuller statistic for the existence of a unit-root. All ADF statistics fell 
below the critical values at the 1% significance level, thus allowing for the usage in the level, rather than first difference. 
Autocorrelation in the model was addressed by using one-year and two-year autoregressive (AR) terms. Both AR terms were 
significant at the 1% level in all four models. The Box-Pierce Q-statistic has a critical value of 7.78 with four degrees of freedom 
at the 10% level, and the statistic indicates the model is free of significant autocorrelation. 
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Table 2 
 Total Crimes Property Violence Burglary 
Constant 5002.7 4503.8 710.5 1553.0 
 (13.28)*** (15.6)*** (7.02)*** (21.88)*** 
COKE -0.08 -0.08 0.002 -.012 
 (-2.63)** (-2.61)** (1.93)** (-1.47) 
UE 150.4 139.4 14.5 47.1 
 (2.58)** (2.56)** (2.59)** (1.8)* 
PRIS 19.95 16.86 -0.74 2.48 
 (2.58)** (2.22)** (-.699) (1.68)* 
ABRT -2.6 -2.31 -0.15 -0.77 
 (-3.97)*** (-4.32)*** (-.65)*** (-7.38)*** 
DEA -0.36 -0.34 -0.34 -0.13 
 (-2.31)** (-2.43)** (-2.43)** (4.7)*** 
GDP -0.18 -0.16 -0.019 -0.047 
 (-5.65)*** (-5.71)*** (-5.64)*** (-3.34)*** 
1986DRG 144.4 108.65 36.75 6.35 
 (2.70)** (2.09)** (3.02)*** (0.38) 
AR(1) 1.29 1.25 1.59 1.04 
 (9.35)*** (8.81)*** (14.57)*** (8.71)*** 
AR(2) -0.55 -0.57 -0.64 -0.53 
 (-3.72)*** (-3.98)*** (-6.02)*** (-4.64)*** 
     
R-square 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 
Adj R-Square 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.98 
F-statistic 131.1 135.91 114.13 193.31 
Q-Stat 3.34 3.19 3.73 5.0 
N 36 36 36 36 
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level 
**   Indicates significance at the 5% level 
*     Indicates significance at the 10% level 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This research suggests that the war on drugs, as measured by the percentage of the federal prison 
population incarcerated for drug related offenses and the existence of the 1986 Anti-Drug Act, may not have led to a 
reduction in crime rates. In fact, the results suggest the opposite. However, as the share of the annual Federal Justice 
budget that has been granted to the DEA increases, crime rates tend to fall. 
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